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Abstract
Calculating and making public carbon footprints is becoming self-evident for multinational 
corporations. Drawing on ethnographic data I narrate of the calculative routine practices involved 
in that process. The narration shows how routine yet sophisticated mathematical transformations 
are involved in retrieving salient information, and second that mathematical consistency is readily 
interrupted by ‘dirty data’. Such interruptions call for opportunistic data management in devising 
work-arounds, which effect enough mathematical coherence for the number to hold together. 
Foregrounding an episode of calculative data retrieval, interruption and work-around contrivance, 
I employ it to make a comparative reading of two STS analytics, arguing: whereas Callon and Law’s 
(2005) analytic technique of qualculation reveals the episode of data management and work around 
contrivance as a teleologically oriented process that manages to bridge mathematical inconsistency, 
Verran’s technique of ontologising troubles enables us to recognise how a number-as-network 
configures its particular kind of certainty and coherence, how it sticks.
Keywords: calculation, number, ontics, ontology, qualculation, empirical philosophy
Introduction
Number studies thrive in Science and Technol-
ogy Studies (STS). STS has raised a range of ques-
tions challenging numbers and calculation. These 
include how chance got quantified and politically 
employed (Hacking, 1990; Desrosières, 2002), how 
accuracy gets constructed (MacKenzie, 1990), 
how trust in numbers is playing out in society, 
technology and economy (Porter, 1995) or how 
equivalences are achieved (Espeland and Stevens, 
1998; MacKenzie, 2009a). The concerns here are 
not about numbers as output of some calcula-
tion, but rather about how numbers and calcula-
tions are employed in practices that constitute 
science, technology, economy—such as knowing 
epistemic objects (Knorr Cetina, 2002), distrib-
uting resources and accountabilities (Strathern, 
2000), constructing economic agents (MacKenzie, 
2009b), setting prices (Fourcade, 2011) or defining 
baselines (Ureta, 2017).
The field of actor-network theory (ANT) has 
been highly instrumental in STS for studying 
material and semiotic entities as relational 
networks (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1987; 
Law, 1992, 2009). ANT studies of numbers and 
calculations have opened up how accounting 
numbers configure action at a distance (Robson, 
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1992), how markets get materialised (Callon, 
1998; Callon and Muniesa, 2005) or how collat-
eral realities get enacted in presenting quantifi-
cations (Law, 2012). In the latter cases, numbers 
and calculations, too, are analysed as compo-
nents of semiotic and materials relations that 
configure science, technology, economy. ANT’s 
power to open up entities as relational networks, 
however, has not been deployed to open up 
specific numbers, numbering or calculations. Two 
notable exceptions are Verran’s (2001) work on 
doing numbers in routinised practices and Callon 
and Law’s (2005) proposal to study calculations as 
interwoven with judgement, using the neologism 
of qualculation.1 Callon’s (1986) concern with 
numbers can be traced back to his work on 
scallops and their conservation at St Brieuc Bay, 
Law readily shares how he learned it from Callon 
(personal communication), whilst Verran (2001), 
disconcerted by her experiences of learning and 
teaching numbers and basic concepts like length 
in Nigeria, set about delving to the insides of 
numbers.
The subfield which this paper operates in, 
then, is the use of ANT to open up the networks 
within numbers or calculations. How to use ANT to 
explore this opening? A number of ANT authors 
point us to ANT not as a consistent body of theory 
but rather as something akin to a toolkit (Latour, 
1996, 1999, 2005; Law, 2009; Verran, 2007b). 
I wonder, then, whether the tools to open up 
numbers and calculations are equivalent, lend 
themselves to the same kind of work. And, I 
suppose, this concern and question is relevant to 
others who want to understand, master or even 
deploy the toolbox of ANT to open up numbers. 
The research question of this paper then is narrow 
and has a methodological form: how do the two 
analytical framings, qualculation and Verran’s take 
on numbers, differ, complement or work against 
each other? This question matters not only for 
enriching our understanding of the ANT toolkit’s 
inner compatibilities and frictions, but also to 
the larger task in STS of spelling out the nuances 
between some of its analytics. 
The question, and the research to address it, is 
novel in that it positions the reader to engage in a 
comparative methodological exercise. This means 
that this paper focuses on studying how the two 
analytics work, in analytic practice. In short, this 
paper presents a study of two ANT techniques. 
Both these techniques are key for ethnographic 
investigations of a number-as-network. To study 
number-as-network this paper employs a method 
of empirical philosophy, narrating a number.
What both analytical approaches share is that 
enumerated concepts, results of calculative and 
quantifying relations, have ‘insides’. This follows 
from a core claim of the ontological commitment 
in ANT to the mattering of material, bodily and 
semiotic practices (Verran, 2001; Callon and Law, 
2005; Law, 2009): doing numbers or calculations 
enacts not only the known but also the knowers.
The argument pursued here is that both 
analytics narrate and analyse numbers/calcula-
tions differently, foregrounding different relations, 
elements or effects of the insides. This means that 
the objective is to show that both approaches 
lend themselves easily to make different points. 
This does not rule out that both approaches 
could be mobilised to say what the respective 
other is saying, too. The point I want to draw out 
is that each approach makes some things easier 
and other things more difficult to explicate. And, 
unsurprisingly, both approaches have not been 
very explicit about what they tend to fore- or 
background. So, the contribution to STS which I 
pursue is to show how these two ANT approaches, 
though similar, are also different, and not easily 
substitutable against each other.
The empirical ethnographic material that I draw 
on in narrating a number deserves an introduc-
tion as much as the choice to use precisely this 
material. The domain in which the number/calcu-
lations I am interested in have been practiced, 
is the field of carbon numbers and economics 
(Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009a; Lohmann, 2009; 
Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011; Ehrenstein and 
Muniesa, 2013; Vesty et al., 2015; Lippert, 2016). 
Specifically, I turn to carbon accounting and book-
keeping, numbering and data practice. This ties in 
with an analytical trajectory that investigates how 
environments are known and come into being 
through data, information, algorithms, simula-
tions, databases and reporting—configured into 
situated practices of environmental manage-
ment and sustainability governance (Elichirigoity, 
1999; Waterton, 2002; Fortun, 2004; Ellis et al., 
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2007; Millerand and Bowker, 2009; Edwards, 2010; 
Gabrys, 2016; Lippert et al., 2015; Blok et al., 2016).
I studied carbon accounting in a financial 
service provider, one of the globally 50 largest 
companies (by revenue). This was an ethnography 
conducted across 20 months, studying the multi-
national’s environmental management work with 
a focus on their material and semiotic practices 
through which they achieved their global carbon 
footprint.2 Opening up numbers of carbon 
accounting involves addressing their indetermi-
nacies and certainties.
To open up number-as-network, I tell a story of 
a number, which has been configured, inter alia by 
myself, the corporation’s sustainability accounting 
database, a subsidiary’s chief operations officer 
(COO) and a worker who put environmental 
numbers together for him. The worker, Nick, 
figures key in my narrating. Most relevant for the 
present paper, Nick was a novice—first-time user/
practitioner—of doing environmental data for the 
company. Studying a novice promises to disclose 
the frictions and work involved in doing numbers 
(cf. Suchman, 2007: 122). Neither Nick nor his 
boss, the officer, were concerned with explaining 
or theorising numbers, data and calculations, 
not with experimentation for making carbon 
markets work (Callon, 2009). Still, my narration 
of the number includes a calculation. And this 
calculation was highly effective as a machine that 
made the corporate carbon accounting exercise 
proceed, a machine that made things work, 
enriching the voluntary carbon market, rather 
than standing in the way (on machines and their 
working, see also Lippert, 2011; Neyland, 2018, in 
this special issue).
Next, I offer some notes on methodology and 
transparency. Then I turn to the core: I narrate a 
number in a way such that the two analytics can be 
deployed; subsequently I introduce the qualcula-
tion analytics, putting it into practice by analysing 
a calculation. Then I present the Verranian 
analytics and use it to ontologise a number’s 
troubles. Finally, I draw together my conclusions 
in terms of the two analytical approaches differ-
ently oriented capacities to foreground specific 
workings within numbers or calculations.
Methodology
This paper is grounded in an ethnography. The 
workers I studied knew I researched them; and I 
was employed to support the company in opti-
mising their environmental accounting database. 
To protect informants, I render names anony-
mous, numbers imprecise and convert currencies 
into EUR.3
This paper’s methodology takes the form of 
empirical philosophy, rather than of systematic 
qualitative data analysis. Following the purpose 
of the present special issue—interrogating 
recent innovations in STS analytics of numbers 
and numbering (Lippert and Verran, 2018)—
for my analysis I have constructed an empirical 
story that serves to interrogate STS analytics. The 
narration, or story, here is not shaped to meet 
specific sociological and ethnographic criteria. 
Storytelling serves here to allow the reader relate 
and attend to key empirical detail, strengthening 
my ability to respond to the troubles I identify in 
and around Nick’s calculation (on response-ability, 
see Haraway, 2016; on storytelling as relational 
practice Kenney, 2015: 758–759). The story is not 
narrated to privilege a particular explanation, 
attempting, drawing on Benjamin (2006), even to 
keep it free from explanation. This choice of meth-
odology suffices to draw out the generativities 
and limitations of particular STS analytics.
The empirical story I present is bundled with 
inferences that draw out the significance of some 
of the relating that shaped the calculation or took 
place within the latter. To be able to analyse the 
practical, epistemic and ontological work in doing 
the calculation, I use the mathematical genre as 
a device: I employ mathematical denominations 
and equations that the numbering and calculation 
practice explicitly referenced or implicitly postu-
lated. Using the mathematical genre stays true to 
some of the forms of rationality that I identify in 
Nick’s practice.
A concern with accurate description or 
grounded theorising would shift the focus away 
from the kind of empirical philosophy I undertake. 
The evidence presented within the empirical 
story may be understood as serving a part-whole 
generalisation (Winthereik and Verran, 2012)—
the kind of numbering and calculation I analyse 
is part of the company’s global carbon footprint 
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and involved in relations to governments and 
investors, i.e. global political economy. One limita-
tion of the kind of empirical philosophy I conduct 
is that this paper in isolation cannot make 
claims about the majority of calculations I have 
studied. The empirical story in this paper, if read 
in isolation, must be understood as an artefact of 
being written to serve the methodologically inter-
ested interrogation of the two ANT analytics.
For the purpose of comparative methodolog-
ical analysis, I offer an interested presentation and 
deployment of both approaches, mediated by a 
partial reading of both, Verran (2001) and Callon 
and Law (2005). Whilst this constitutes another 
limitation of this methodology, an exhaustive 
review of the authors and their approaches is 
beyond the scope of this paper and not needed 
for the purpose of the comparative exercise. To 
respond to the research question, it suffices to 
identify differences between both approaches 
that are salient to the empirically grounded data 
and inferences that I narrate.
Narrating a number
The multinational’s accounting database, acces-
sible as a Lotus-Notes based application in the 
corporate intranet, included forms, suitable called 
‘task forms’, which subsidiary environmental 
agents were tasked to fill (as an illustration, view 
the form for reporting water consumption, Figure 
1). I wanted to learn about the ways data gets con-
structed. My own boss at the headquarters (HQ) 
allowed me to travel to a Western Asian subsidi-
ary, study their environmental data practices, and 
she tasked me to support subsidiary staff. So, off 
I went, arrived in the megacity, housing the mul-
tinational’s regional sub-HQ. On my second day 
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Figure 1. ‘Task’: General form for environmental data entry (this screenshot documents Nick’s form use to report 




in the city, after a bus tour on a hot summer day, 
through the Eastern parts of the city, and then into 
the better neighbourhoods, finally I arrived at the 
modern steel-glass block. I entered the building, 
was asked whom I wanted to see, and after some 
back and forth was led to the subsidiary’s COO. 
He occupied a large office, with a glossy wooden 
desk and several square metres of windows at the 
top of the building.
Early in our meeting Nick Xi joined us and 
presented a list of numbers to hiss boss, the COO. 
Later on I learned: Nick was the office site’s head 
engineer, a novice in environmental accounting. 
Nick had been asked to retrospectively collect the 
2008 environmental data that the HQ was seeking. 
Subsequently, Nick showed me around at the site, 
and, eventually, we went to his office, located in 
the building’s windowless basement. His work 
space was neighbouring round six other desks. 
Nick and I soon got to work in depth, me doing 
participating observation and helping him out, 
clarifying things when he had questions, and Nick 
drawing together various environmental data. We 
worked, and worked, and, let me fast forward, to 
the next day of working with Nick, he sitting on his 
red chair, and me at his beige desk on this Friday 
afternoon, directly after lunch, between 2–4pm, 
in spring 2009. His desk was set up with two land 
line telephones, a computer screen, mouse and 
keyboard.
Nick picked up the phone to ask a colleague 
about the distances travelled by staff of his 
company. In the conversation he learned about 
the costs incurred in the prior year for domestic 
flights, 168,078 EUR. This phone conversation 
made him laugh and smile. His work equipment 
included a paper, to note the numbers and to 
conduct some simple calculations, like additions, 
multiplications and divisions. He next divided the 
flight cost number by 230 EUR, an average cost of 
each flight, and multiplied the result with 500 kilo-
metres, an average distance crossed with domestic 
flights. With the result of this calculation ready, he 
turned to his computer and entered the result in 
the ‘task’ form for reporting the distances travelled 
on short-haul flights. At this point I intervened, 
suggesting to Nick to also briefly describe in the 
form’s comment field how he had calculated the 
estimation. He hesitated, but then agreed.
Five inferences bring out the richness of Nick’s 
calculating, mixing the ethnographic with the 
mathematical genre. Nick mobilised the total cost 
fact for the calculation. Where did this fact come 
from? Picking up the phone, Nick had called a 
colleague and received the cost fact on domestic 
flights for the subsidiary. This is not trivial. And this 
is the first inference. While for this particular case 
he managed to ‘immediately’ access such a cost 
fact for the totality of the subsidiary, with other 
environmental indicators he had to struggle more. 
For instance, Nick was also to report his subsidi-
ary’s water consumption data. Yet, some of his 
subsidiary sites did (or could) neither fully report 
water costs nor the consumed amounts. So, Nick 
extrapolated the available site-specific consump-
tion facts to the scale of the subsidiary, with calcu-
lations, materially supported by spreadsheets, pen 
and paper. Luckily, for calculating flight distances, 
Nick was equipped with an already complete fact; 
no need to extrapolate towards the total costs at 
subsidiary level: at the end of his phone call, thus, 
he laughed and smiled.
Knowing that the organisation had paid 
168,078 EUR for domestic flights did not tell 
him how many kilometres have been bridged, 
however. Nick reconstructed the cost fact corre-
sponding to a particular mathematical form, my 
second inference: as the sum of several individual 
flights, totalling n flights, each with a cost, cn. He 
effectively exploded one number into many.
Unfortunately, Nick had not received information, 
at this point in time, about each flight’s associ-
ated costs, c1 to cn; all the individual costs were 
as unknown to him as the number (n) of and 
distances (d1 to dn) travelled with flights. From 
observing Nick exploding the total cost fact and 
transforming it into the cognitive form, shown 
in Equation 1, I infer, thirdly, that this cognitive 
understanding inspired Nick to use a mathemati-
cal routine, well known to him, that would allow 
ignoring all these unknowns. Thus, Nick expli-
cated assumptions about these individual flights, 
specifying each flight in two dimensions, in terms 







, and one of the distance of an individual flight, 
	 . For instance: ‘I assume, on average a domes-
tic flight bridges a distance of 500 kilometres and 
costs 230 EUR.’ Mathematically, he postulated 
 =230 EUR and 	=500 km. To be even more 
explicit, these assumptions implied:
as well as
And, Nick knew what he was searching for: the 
total distance travelled by short-haul flights, sum 
of all the flights’ distances, 


	 . My fourth infer-
ence is then: making such assumptions, when 
equipped with the total cost and searching for 
the total distance travelled, presented Nick with a 
clean structure of statements (illustrated by Table 
1), leaving only one unknown element, the quanti-
fier x for the data type total flight distance in km.
Nick treated this frame of triples with only 
one unknown as mathematically exploitable, my 
fifth inference. He identified the two repeating 
units, km and EUR. Dividing the average distance 
travelled per flight by the the average cost of a 
flight, and multiplying the result with the total 
cost fact, Nick could cancel out the two EUR units, 
resulting in a data point with the unit km.
This is the corresponding mathematical form:
In a differently plain language, for the qualitative 
STS scholar:
And this is the calculation:
Despite the more or less overwhelming math-
ematical richness, Nick swiftly and seemingly 
routinely solved the problem of the missing 
data point and entered it in the short-haul flight 
accounting form.
Entering data into the environmental database 
was part of a routine of what the headquarters 
(HQ) called ‘environmental data collection’ in the 
company. The collected data was reviewed at 
the HQ, checked for inconsistences or obvious 
errors, followed by possible corrections. All the 
unique data points, indicating the consump-
tion of water, electricity and paper as well as the 
distances travelled and the amounts of waste 
disposed, were multiplied with specific factors 
that converted each data point into the amount 
of carbon emissions (CO2e) resulting from the 
respective consumption.4 For example, according 
to standard conversion factors, short-haul flights 
cause higher emissions, per kilometre, than long-
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Table 1. Structure of statements.
Knowledge status Framed triples of data Math.
Quantifier Unit Data type
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Figure 2. ‘Employee footprint’, extract from the corporation’s Sustainable Development Report (Source: Lippert, 
2013: 206).
distance flights.5 The amounts of emissions were 
then summed up into a carbon footprint reported 
on a balance-sheet, for each subsidiary as well 
as for the global operations of the multinational. 
This footprint was communicated to stakeholders, 
including auditors, partners, investors govern-
ments and civil society organisations, for instance 
in the form of relating last year’s (2008) average 
carbon footprint per employee to the target of 
emission reduction in the future (2015), as illus-
trated in Figure 2.
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Later the afternoon, Nick received an email 
that contained a spreadsheet. The latter detailed 
which cost items have been part of the account 
for domestic flights. The list included diverse items 
such as flights, restaurant visits, trips by boat and 
taxi and visa fees. He called out: The list includes 
lunch! Despite the skilled mathematical routine, it 
seemed clear the data could not be used. And so 
it proved.
Before the workday ended, Nick and I went 
to see Nick’s boss. In this meeting we talked 
through a range of uncertain issues (that are not 
at the centre of this story), which Nick and I had 
encountered. In his reaction, the boss made one 
point very clear: he demanded Nick to only report 
facts; no insecure estimations! A few days later the 
comment Nick had originally added to the flight 
data had disappeared; and the distance itself had 
decreased to 60 percent of the distance Nick had 
calculated earlier.
What has happened, to summarise, is that Nick 
was tasked to report short-haul flight data. This 
data did not exist. So he contrived a work around, 
employing mathematical routines to retrieve the 
data he was to report. This work around contriv-
ance drew on domestic flights’ cost data and 
Nick used his calculation’s output as input to the 
short-haul flight reporting form. Yet, later, Nick 
realised that his mathematical ‘trick’ for recovering 
distances from the domestic flight data would not 
work well because the cost figures included other 
costs that go along with staff taking flights—like 
buying lunch during the journey! The data was 
dirty! Eventually, Nick’s subsidiary had reported 
a lower figure. I was not there to observe how 
precisely this has been derived but I suppose that 
Nick withdrew the ‘non-flight’ cost items from 
the total cost fact of the domestic flights sum 
(data cleaning). And I know that Nick’s subsidiary 
did not posses distance data. Thus I infer he was 
otherwise going through the same series of math-
ematical assumptions and calculations. Closing 
off, as instructed he did neither draw attention 
to this ‘internal adjustment’ nor the assumptions 
in the short-haul flight reporting form. For the 
purposes of this paper, I end my narration here—
though of course the story continues, elsewhere. 
It is this episode in the ‘doing of this number’ that 
serves the purpose of comparing STS number 
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analytics. And, thus, I turn now to analysing this 
episode.
Qualculation
This section re-presents the qualculation 
approach, deploys it to re-narrate numbers, math-
ematical forms and a calculation and, at the end, 
draws out what I discern from this deployment 
about the qualculation approach in practice. I 
argue that the qualculation approach lends itself 
to foregrounding how a calculation achieves a 
form that effects connection, in this case securing 
quantitative calculability despite mathematical 
inconsistencies.
Borrowing the notion qualculation from Frank 
Cochoy,6 Callon and Law (2005: 718, 722) argue 
for dismantling the dichotomy between the calcu-
lative and the noncalculative, instead positing 
both as mutually constitutive: the very distinc-
tion dissolves when we consider a boundary as 
achieving both, one side and its Other. Positively 
speaking, they use the notion qualculation to 
suggest that calculation and judgment are inter-
woven. This interwoven character comes to the 
foreground in their thinking of calculation as a 
‘three-stage process’. This process can be read and 
deployed as a robust instrument, as evidenced in 
this special issue by Gorur (2018), Holtrop (2018) 
and Neyland (2018). In this section I primarily 
focus on this qualculation process as an analytic 
instrument and deploy it, subsequently analysing 
what the instrument foregrounds.
First, the relevant entities are sorted out, detached, 
and displayed within a single space. Note that 
the space may come in a wide variety of forms 
or shapes: a sheet of paper, a spreadsheet, a 
supermarket shelf, or a court of law—all of 
these and many more are possibilities. Second, 
those entities are manipulated and transformed. 
Relations are created between them, again in a 
range of forms and shapes: movements up and 
down lines; from one place to another; scrolling; 
pushing a trolley; summing up the evidence. And, 
third, a result is extracted. A new entity is produced. 
A ranking, a sum, a decision. A judgment. A 
calculation. And this new entity corresponds 
precisely to—is nothing other than—the relations 
and manipulations that have been performed 
along the way. (Callon and Law, 2005: 719)
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My partial reading of Callon and Law elabo-
rates this three-stage process. Core to the first 
stage is the existence of entities that are disen-
tangled from other relations, rearranged and by 
that ordered to fit a space. In that respect, the 
first stage needs to be considered as performing 
a relational and categorical shift: the entities’ 
connections are severed and they come to fit into 
the boxes of specific sorts. Within this space, in 
the second stage, these entities are rearranged by 
positioning them into new relationships between 
each other. The authors address these relational 
changes as manipulations and transformations 
of the entities themselves. In the final stage, out 
of these rearranged entities, a statement is drawn 
(‘the result’). They plausibilise their generalisation 
by referring to several versions of such spaces and 
transformations: For the supermarket and the 
trolley, consider Lave (1988) and Cochoy (2008), 
for the court of law Latour (2009) and for sheets of 
paper and spreadsheets Lippert (2015).
Callon and Law (2005) specify their model in 
several ways. I identify two larger points. First, they 
clarify that the entities, ‘objects’, are manipulated 
‘within a single spatiotemporal frame’ (Callon and 
Law, 2005: 719). True to post-ANT considerations, 
they suggest that the entities do not preexist their 
framing. The framing shapes the object; making 
entities fit the box, the order, constitutes new 
entities. In short, with Mol (2002), the framing 
enacts its objects. And framing comes with 
overflows, all that which does not fit in (Callon 
1998). Qualculation as enacting new entities 
means also that the practice of qualculating is 
both, material and semiotic. For that they point to, 
inter alia, ‘paper and pencil; the benches in a court 
of law; a system for tallying arrivals and depar-
tures’ (Callon and Law, 2005: 719). Each of these 
frames and framings comes with specific spatiality 
and temporality; their shapes and topologies are 
potentially indefinite. Enacting any particular form 
takes time, is work, is an achievement. The effort 
consists of disentangling entities from others, 
removing and adding relations.
Second, I propose, Callon and Law (2005) model 
qualculation as intentional action—between the 
lines. In a summarising sentence, they suggest 
that qualculations “are all about arraying and 
manipulating entities in a space in order to achieve 
an outcome, a conclusion” (Callon and Law, 2005: 
719, emphasis added). Thus, qualculations come 
with a purpose, i.e. a telos; they are practices for 
the purpose of producing their result. When 
the two authors turn to addressing the modes 
and practices of achieving non-qualculability,7 
they engage with Quaker worship and agapè as 
“strateg[ies] of calculative rarefaction” (Callon and 
Law, 2005: 723). Common to both are intentional 
practices of being passionate. “The Quakers have 
a set of material and discursive practices for disen-
tangling from qualculability. For losing them-
selves in the passionate” (Callon and Law, 2005: 
722, emphasis added). The disentanglement is 
purposefully produced in material and discursive 
practices. This analysis of resisting qualculability 
resonates, for the authors, with Power’s (1999) 
take on accountability in ‘audit society’. Making 
accountability is work, and so is making unac-
countability (Callon and Law 2005, 725; see also 
Gorur, 2018, in this special issue). Achieving unac-
countability is tough. I read their model of (non)
qualculation, then, as purposeful action, in which 
actors or strategies are directed towards results, 
using resources to achieve these results. Whilst 
their analysis is not limiting qualculation to inten-
tional action, all their cases involve intentional 
actors, trying to achieve particular (un)account-
abilities and (non)qualculabilities.
To put the instrument of qualculation into 
action, I distil from the prior discussion the 
following questions: by which configuration 
of material and discursive practices do actors 
achieve what kind of simultaneously qualcula-
tive and non-qualculative space? How has Nick 
actually managed to produce this agencement 
which we tend to refer to as calculation? What 
do we grasp by analysing this as a mathematical 
operation? Conceptualising this set of relations, 
this movement of signs, as a mathematical office 
operation suggests that all the entities involved in 
it are unproblematic; we grasp it as a rule-following 
method, an implementation of the rules of multi-
plication and division. This understanding misses 
the practical point of the operation: it was not 
about solving a mathematical problem but about 
bringing into reality an entity that before had not 
existed. Thus, Nick’s practice had a transformative 
character: it altered the form of how these entities 
existed; he assembled them in a shared plane in 
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which he conducted the operation. This transfor-
mative movement deserves spelling out.
In what follow, I map the three stages by Callon 
and Law onto my narration of Nick’s calculation 
and numbers. According to qualculation’s first 
stage, Nick had to initially sort out and detach 
some entities that he could work with. The total 
cost fact, which he had received, was already of a 
sort that he could employ well. This, however, was 
not self-evident. In the cases of several other envi-
ronmental key performance indicators, Nick had 
not received total cost facts, but had to construct 
those.
Yet, whilst Nick was able to employ the total 
cost fact, in isolation the fact did not suffice. Nick 
next created further statements that effectively 
reconstructed the total cost fact via a mathemat-
ical form: as the sum of several individual flights. 
This reconceptualisation expanded the possibility 
for calculability. He could now make assump-
tions about these individual flights—he defined 
the average cost and distance travelled per flight. 
The postulations depicted in Equation 2 and 
Equation 3 mean that Nick judged his assump-
tion of the two averages,   and  	 , to be suffi-
ciently equivalent with the real flights costs and 
distances (textbook mathematics, in contrast, 
would require some form of signifier like standard 
deviation to specify the degree of equivalence). 
Nick’s judgement was relevant to bridge the gap 
between the different sources of information, the 
phone call’s provision of the total costs versus 
his own experience of flights. In this moment he 
used situated judgement about these relations, 
I presume his local knowledge of distances and 
flight costs in the subsidiary’s region of operations, 
rather than documented traces that might have 
established a link between the averages and the 
individual flights’ distance/cost facts. These inter-
woven judgements, bridging the gap across the 
two different kinds of sources, are by no means 
self-evident. Politics and economics, in particular 
cost-benefit analysis, recognise the significance of 
this kind of treatment, calling it commensuration 
(see Adorno and Horkheimer, 2006: 13–14; Porter, 
1995: Ch. 4; Patterson, 1998): “Commensuration 
transforms qualities into quantities, difference into 
magnitude.” (Espeland and Stevens, 1998: 316)
And the accounting database form made clear 
what he was working towards: the total distance 
travelled, in km, for which he lacked the quanti-
fier. Thus, at the outset, here, we can identify four 
statements (one given fact, two assumptions and 
one searched for result, the partial statement). 
He had, thus, disentangled the total cost fact and 
the body of flights these costs represented into 
four statements and drew all these statements 
together. With Callon and Law (2005: 719) we can 
think of his practices as sorting out and detaching 
these statements from the wide range of data 
held by financial accountants and of the possible 
assumptions he could have made. They call this 
process qualculation, underlining the involvement 
of judgment and qualification with quantification 
and calculation. The qualification here consists 
precisely in performing these statements and 
relations as appropriate rather than others. Not 
only could the assumptions have been different 
(such as specifying the average distance or costs 
with other quantifiers) but also could have the 
statement structure been alternatively configured 
(in fact, below, I introduce how Nick later chal-
lenged the structure himself ). The selection, thus, 
of precisely these statements created and prefig-
ured a space in which the subsequent calculation 
had to take place.
Now that the relevant entities are enacted and 
detached from another, they need to be “displayed 
within a single space” (Callon and Law, 2005: 719) 
to conclude qualculation’s first stage; the space of 
these four statements needed to be transformed 
to perform in two ways: first, the space needed 
to allow for calculation and, second, the calcula-
tion’s results needed to fit the material structure 
of the company’s environmental database, i.e. 
its data entry form (cf. Figure 1). Thus, again, the 
accounting form guided Nick in how he worked. 
This form required the total distance travelled by 
short-haul flights to be represented with specific 
qualifiers and quantifiers: these included, first, the 
quantitative ‘value’ of the flight distance (i.e. the 
number) and the ‘unit’ (kilometres), second a ‘value’ 
and a ‘unit’ of corresponding costs and, optionally, 
a qualitative ‘comment’ on this particular data set. 
A possible inscription structure that prepares this 
list for calculability is to reimagine/rewrite the 
statements as triples. The calculation which Nick 
eventually performed, thus, corresponded to a 
three-fold structured space, depictable as a table 
(illustrated by Table 1). This space is marked with 
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a boundary of in/exclusion: to be excluded were 
the traces of the statements’ sources. The fact that 
some statements were assumptions got lost in the 
framing—Nick was focused on the numbers.
With this first stage of organising qualities and 
quantities, Nick achieved new entities: once in 
the table, flights and costs existed in the shape 
of numbers, units and categories. The table itself 
framed these shapes in particular ways. The 
qualities of framing extend from the design of 
the data entry form to Nick’s preparation of data 
for that form. Thus, the entities drawn together 
by Nick were transformed and changed shape; 
the resulting objects did not preexist their 
framing. Those qualities that did not fit in, are the 
overflows that Callon (1998) addresses: making 
things calculable means framing them and that 
necessarily implies that some things do not fit the 
frame and flow over the frame.8 The boundary-
drawing performs a qualification of how numbers 
are present in this space. Nick’s employment of 
the framed triples (in Table 1) shows that he is 
precisely not just dealing with hypothetical, in an 
undeconstructed sense, ‘numbers’ but with inter-
woven qualities, categories and units. The triples 
do not prepare some ‘calculation’ (in an undecon-
structed sense) but a much more specific qualcu-
lation.
This selection, positioning and framing allows 
for the second stage in the qualculation process 
model: to actually informationally treat the four 
statements in relation to each other. Nick related 
the costs of all flights to the average cost of a 
single flight. This means he treated these kinds 
of costs as being of an equivalent quality. And he 
handled the average distance of a single flight as 
qualitatively non-distinct from the sought for total 
distance travelled. In both relations, he treated the 
two statements related as quantitatively different, 
rather than qualitatively. Nick achieved quite 
simple arithmetic relating—an ongoing relation—
that took the form presented in Equation 6. Stage 
two of the qualculation instrument, points us, 
thus, to the calculative machinery, the central 
component of the equation:
Without structuring triples in this way the 
information would have been different. In this 
mathematical form, the entities of the table are 
rearranged so that they appear simultaneously 
qualitatively and quantitatively compatible, 
thus, calculatively relatable. Now, consider Nick’s 
judgement that his structure of treatment was 
apt. This is a key qualification, underwriting the 
calculative machinery, a second commensurating 
move.
Finally, in the third stage of the qualculation 
process, the arithmetic practice mathematically 
related the three framed triples, shown in the 
middle column of Table 1. These three triples 
were solved for the one remaining unknown 
with Equation 7, producing a result, 365,387 km, 
effectively a fourth triple: a) the value/quantifier 
365,387, b) the unit km and c) the category total 
flight distance. This result was, importantly, tech-
nically compatible with the accounting short-haul 
flight reporting form’s field for numeric input, and 
its option to select km as a unit, and this is a point 
I come back to. To summarise, Nick related the 
triples that he heaved into this space in a way that 
allowed him to produce a result for the unknown 
slot. With this calculation he produced the fact, 
the very data which he was to report. Nick, thus 
reported through the database environmental 
data that he first had to bring into existence in a 
thoroughly qualculative performance.
This story of qualculation nearly gets slightly 
messed up when we consider the spreadsheet 
that Nick received in the afternoon. Some of its 
elements threatened to undermine the calcula-
bility, which Nick had so routinely achieved and 
we have so painstakingly adumbrated. Nick made 
judgement about these troubling entities of the 
spreadsheet. I never did learn what precisely 
happened subsequently. I can only report that, 
eventually, this Western Asian subsidiary reported 
a smaller sum; the total distance crossed by means 
of short-haul flights was reduced. Nick effectively 
managed to avert the threat to calculability: he 
delivered a result to the headquarters. Yet, the 
spreadsheet did not detail the distances travelled 
by each domestic flight, d1 to dn.
Zooming out, one further calculative-quali-
fying move comes in light. Lingering between the 
lines so far, Nick’s task was to fill the form for the 





indicator short-haul flights, y. Following Callon 
and Law (2005: 719) ‘[t]hings have to qualify 
before they can enter a process of qualcula-
tion’. Nick’s qualculative practice performed the 
domestic flight cost data, x, which he received, 
and subsequently employed in his arithmetics, as 
qualifying for the short-haul flight travel account.
Nick, practicing this qualculation, could be cer-
tain that his work of slipping and connecting 
was organisationally appreciated—contrasting 
with Coopmans’ (2018) analysis of the trouble of 
workers who have not been managing to solve 
a disconnect through clever numbering. Nick 
employed his judgement and calculative rou-
tines making x fit the form of y, even if this final 
slippage in reference was collateral, a ‘collateral 
reality’ (Law, 2012) of inserting the quantifier for 
the domestic flight data in the form for short-haul 
flights.
The mathematical tension here did not concern 
Nick. Whilst multiple interpretations are possible, 
Nick situationally judged well, that his achieve-
ment of connecting sources to the data form 
would not generate organisational tensions but, 
rather, comfort (on comfort, see Pentland, 1993).
What do we learn about the instrument of 
qualculation? By way of rethinking Nick’s work 
as qualculating, we overcome the misleading 
dichotomy between calculation and judgement. 
In actual practice they overlap. This is no news 
to accounting scholars (e.g. Pentland, 1993; 
Robson, 1992). The point was not only to demon-
strate a case of qualculation. I am concerned with 
analysing the apparent ease of a calculation—of a 
class that was not at all exceptional, but was and 
is exercised, constantly, ubiquitously. Defamiliar-
ising such a calculation is a hard case.
The qualculation approach is generative in 
that Callon and Law’s (2005) take translates the 
hard defamiliarisation task into a quite simply 
procedure, consisting of the three stages. 
These were quite straight forward to apply. This 
approach allowed us to identify the entities 
employed by Nick and helps us see their satura-
tion with politics: at several moments other quali-
fiers and quantifiers, other structures and moves 
of relating them, could have been opted for. Qual-
culation, then, seemingly offers an instrument for 
analytically narrating; we get a well-tellable story 
in which even the challenge to calculability even-
tually disappears when the qualculation’s telos is 
realised in the reporting of a result to the HQ.
Core to this style of qualculation analysis is 
that it generates a story of Nick as intentionally 
treating the data in a way to achieve a number 
that can be plugged into9 the multinational’s 
central environmental database. Nick had started 
out with one determinate entity, the total cost 
fact, and rapidly conjured up further claims that 
turned into certainties in their tabular formation 
and were enrolled in the equation form to solve 
for his target not-yet-determined number, the 
total distance travelled by short-haul flights. I 
applied the qualculation analytics and found it 
to guide me in narrating of progressively more 
determinacy along the stages towards the result 
that Nick achieved. Determination, then, charac-
terises both what I analysed and how I analysed it. 
Indeterminacy is first solved, and when new inde-
terminacies cropped up in the form of unwelcome 
content of the spreadsheet, these were overcome. 
In sum, Callon and Law’s (2005) approach is gener-
ative of a story of a directed chain of enactments 
with the clear target of dissolving indeterminacy: 
the solute of indeterminacy changes its visibility, 
rendered invisible in the fact delivered to the HQ.
Callon and Law’s (2005) qualculation approach 
configures a narration that conveys how (non)
qualculability is achieved and secured. The qualcu-
lation instrument is generative of foregrounding 
how connections are made, relations established, 
in order—intentionally—to effect either qual-
culability or non-qualculability. Callon and Law 
are fittingly quite concerned with differentiating 
strategies to achieve these. This instruments’ focus 
on strategies to achieve either, qualculability or 
non-qualculability, establishes simultaneously a 
dichotomy—collateral damage?
The approach does not encourage me to 
analyse and attend to the fascinating fastidious-
ness and assiduousness of Nick, his practices of 
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making things very clear, reading the spread-
sheet in detail, cleaning up data, indicating how 
he got to his fact in a comment and deleting it, 
attending to some of the data troubles. Maybe 
because these are not central to his practices’ 
telos, securing qualculability? But they seem to 
be important elements in shaping these calcula-
tions and the mode of qualculability. Yet, these 
are neither about (non)qualculability nor the 
measurable degrees thereof. Whilst the authors, 
Callon and Law, surely have capacity to engage 
with these elements, their three-stage approach 
of qualculation and the strategies for achieving 
(non)qualculability do not lend themselves to 
open up these elements. In fact, Callon and Law 
(2005: 724–725) position qualculation as Other to 
the space of (pre)trust, care and agapè.
How then did these elements matter? I suspect 
these are about qualities of relations of account-
ability and I am disconcerted about their (missing) 
relevance in the qualculation analytics’ study of 
the incremental crystallisation of the reported 
data on short-haul flights as certain.
Ontologising troubles
Nick did not voice troubles, but my narration does. 
Does it matter that Nick offered a comment, like 
in the centre section of Figure 1, deleted it and 
cleaned up the data? In introducing this section’s 
deployment of Verranian analytics, and with 
Verran (2001), clearly, yes, it does. It does matter 
because the comments’ explication of how Nick 
had calculated the result as well as the sorting 
out of inappropriate elements, i.e. data cleaning, 
involve commitments to, or explications of, what 
these data are. So Nick had faced ontological 
troubles which he engaged with by deleting the 
comment and cleaning data. Verran (2001) would 
point to Science and an African Logic, Mr. Ojo and 
herself, ontologising troubles in the classroom.
In turning to Verran’s work, I am not renarrating 
what the qualculation analytics was able to scruti-
nise. Instead, I deploy her work to attend to how 
it comes that the mathematical inconsistency, 
troubles, in the work achieved did not shatter 
Nick’s qualculation. I argue that Nick ontologically 
accomplished a calculation that achieved a config-
uration of certainties, in plural(!), that sufficiently 
cohered, allowing the result to stick. Cohering 
elements contribute to amassing certainty, 
despite mathematical inconsistency. This section 
brings forward, and then alter-ontologises, the 
troubles in Nick’s work. Ontologising, then, is 
the instrument I draw from Verran. To continue, 
I initially introduce Verran’s take on ontology as 
practice and subsequently deploy it to analyse a 
subset of relations of the number-as-network.10 I 
close this section with a reflection about the way 
Verranian (re)ontologising foregrounds elements 
and relations in enumerated entities.
Practicing a form of juxtapositioning that does 
not privilege Western or Scientific standards, 
Verran offers a form of empirical philosophy that 
draws on engagement with both indigenous 
community as well as western science and techno-
science. To start in the middle, consider her book’s 
end in which she calls for “telling of the rituals 
and the coparticipants, human and nonhuman, 
living and nonliving, in microworlds, as reliable 
ways of managing complexity” (Verran, 2001: 
238). In order to narrate and ontologise Nick’s, or 
my, troubles, we need a sense of her notions of 
microworlds and ritual. 
I consider counting objects like books a 
repeated routine performance. Verran (2001) calls 
such performances microworlds, or micro-worlds 
(Verran, 2002), based on Rouse’s (1987) work on 
laboratories. She specifies microworlds as mate-
rially and semiotically configured time-places 
featuring routinising practices of interrogation, 
naming and tracking, effecting the boundaries 
of stuff, rather than passively reading preexisting 
entities. In such a microworld, the exclusion of 
irrelevant complexity is similarly routine. Microw-
orlds produce realness. She highlights the reoc-
curring character of microworlds, repeatedness, 
routine and ritual, with her concept of clotting. 
“An object clots when the repetitions and routines 
of its generating microworld become a ritual.” 
(Verran, 2001: 162) The repetitions and re-perfor-
mances in ritual-like ways pre-figure and pre-
script and, thus, stabilise their objects, gradually 
and relationally coagulating the objects and its 
shape. Normally, the case of counting routines is 
safely ignored, leaving the material and semiotic 
processes of clotting specific numbers often 
invisible (Verran, 2007a: 37–38).
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She develops these considerations in Science 
and an African Logic and proposes that in the very 
practices of counting an object not only is the 
number performed but the object too. Following 
her approach, the pure matter of, say, books when 
we count them is not antecedent to the action but 
is brought into reality in that very performance. 
Face your distributed bookshelves; any count is an 
outcome of relational practice involving nonliving 
participants, e.g. paper and digital entities, living 
like ourselves, counting some entities as books, a 
multi-volume work as 1 book, excluding others. 
Being certain of the count emerges within doing 
counting, that is in the acting within a relationally 
configured situation. The bookshelves in my study 
room surely can be assessed as complex; but more 
importantly, the narration of the number at the 
core of this paper clearly shows the simultaneous 
simplicity and complexity within Nick’s qualcula-
tion.
More importantly than the degree of 
complexity—numbers, numbering and how 
certainty is embedded within them appears, in 
the Verranian approach, as an effect of particular 
situated relating. Drawing on her work amongst 
Yoruba children learning calculating, she 
proposes: “Certainty of numbers is an outcome 
of the routines by which they are constituted in 
collective acting” (Verran, 1999: 150).
Her approach does not limit itself to numbers, 
but explores more widely what, and how, things 
are. This she calls ontological investigation (Verran, 
1998) or empirical ontology (Verran, 2005). Core 
to this approach is to “refuse any and all a priori 
separations” in relational practices, characterising 
Verran’s (2005: 42, her emphases) take as monist, 
whilst narrating things, society and nature as 
effected in those practices.
Core to the instrument of ontologising is the 
analytical division of labour between two narra-
tions:
• Ontic narrations refer to ‘the level of entities’ 
existence or being’ (Verran, 2007a: 34), i.e. 
realness, where entities are to be understood 
as actor-networks, that are accomplished, 
performed in material-semiotic practices that 
include our practices’ (not necessarily explicit) 
commitments to these entities being there.11
• Ontologic narrations are characterised by 
explicitly explaining, studying or theorising 
what is and the metaphysical commitments 
to what is; this ontology is materially-semioti-
cally performed and, thus, may shape reality-
making.12 Ontologising, however, does not 
necessarily determine its object, the reality 
being enacted.
To deploy this instrument, I narrate two discon-
certments that the qualculation instrument did 
not easily allow me to story. Firstly, I turn to clean-
ing data, and, secondly, to the comment.
Lunch! Whilst the qualculation approach was 
able to register that data cleaning took place, I 
sense a richness in the moment of Nick receiving 
the spreadsheet and recognising the range of 
non-flights inscribed into the domestic flights 
account. Nick calling out ‘lunch!’ only made sense 
in relation to the spreadsheet that included a line, 
implying that some lunch cost had been part of 
the accumulated flight costs. In this evocation, 
then, Nick indexes the spreadsheet’s lunch line. 
This specific line troubled Nick. Lunch was out of 
place. This implies that Nick was committed to the 
sort of things that would be correctly listed in the 
spreadsheet. He was concerned about the wrong 
entity being in the list. This means, Nick was able 
to draw a border between different categories, 
marking some as not fitting with the category of 
flights. Lunch was easy. Taxi costs more difficult, 
because they were clearly part of the overarching 
key performance indicator ‘travel’, of which ‘short-
haul flights’ have been part. Evidently Nick was 
exercising a logic of what flights are. Lunches are 
not flights.
With Verran we can call Nick’s practice of 
storying lunch as not being a member of the 
category flight as doing ontology. Nick ontolo-
gised flights. Lunch in the flight account troubled 
his ontology. Interestingly, before Nick got the 
spreadsheet, he was not troubled by the lunch 
line yet. That is because he was enacting the 
flights differently then, with a different ontology, 
an untroubled one. The flight data, before the 
spreadsheet, were practiced as pure flights. Flight 
data after the spreadsheet was impure. His ontolo-
gising had shifted.
Nick must have noted then that the flight data 
body he was working with was different from what 
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he felt committed to. He had been doing a reality 
all along, ritually, over the many steps I narrated 
above, an ontic practice, that was committed 
to including the original domestic flights’ total 
costs in deriving the total distance travelled by 
short-haul flights. So, whilst his practices were 
committed to enacting short-haul flights all along, 
after reading the spreadsheet, he nuanced his 
allegiance, his commitment.
Cleaning data, eventually effecting a smaller 
total distance fact, was enacting then a different 
ontology, to which his practice was committed, 
a smaller x inserted into the form of short-haul 
flights. In this ontology lunches are not flights, and 
routinely x equals y, as an ontic effect, domestic 
flight data remains slipped into the account for 
short-haul flights.
In the microworld of Nick ‘gathering’ data and 
entering that into the central database’s forms, 
numbers were part of clotting several data sets, 
just like the short-haul flights. These clots have 
been stabilised. That we assess the short-haul 
flight fact as being erroneous does not (seem to) 
affect that this subsidiary’s 2008 data has been 
maintained and employed by the corporation for 
many years. To my knowledge, the multi-authored, 
with Nick as a core author, clot continues to be 
enacted as part of the historic, this subsidiary’s 
baseline, data of environmental impacts.
Now, on to the second disconcertment. When 
Nick had first entered the result of his calculation I 
had asked him to enter a comment on his calcula-
tion in the data entry form. He then had described 
in the comment field how he had gotten to the 
total distance fact (to illustrate, see the comment 
section in the entry form, Figure 1). By offering 
this comment he offered a trace of what his fact 
meant, effectively telling a story about what his 
number was. Simultaneously, this established the 
fact as troubled because it was not a straightfor-
ward fact, speaking securely for itself. I suggest 
this kind of storying work can be considered an 
ontological practice because it explains what the 
number of the total distance crossed by means of 
short-haul flights consisted of.
In the conversation with Nick’s boss, Nick was 
told to only report facts; no insecure estimations. 
In tension with this demand, his comment did 
point to the two estimations involved in the calcu-
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lations, the average distances and costs,  and 
	 , qualifying the total distance fact as a calcu-
lated estimate, not securely signalling factishness. 
The explication of trouble got, thus, troubled, and 
troublingly the trouble got hidden: a few days 
later the comment was deleted. The numbers 
without comment showed no trace of their history 
anymore, no contingency, no trouble.
What did deleting the comment do to 
emissions? A data set that came with a comment 
was signalled to the database user at the head-
quarters and prompted them to review that data 
set. Trouble! This algorithmic function served 
to support the system in achieving account-
ability. It was considered necessary by the system 
designers because the company recognised that 
sometimes numbers required some explanation; 
numbers did not always tell all relevant stories on 
their own. Comments, thus, enriched the ontology 
of environmental data, by serving as unstructured 
metadata. Without comments, those data users 
who had no direct contact to the agent-entering-
data had less chance to actually learn about 
some of the considerations around the numbers 
reported. Yet a different form of trouble. Simulta-
neously, no comments also meant that superiors 
were less likely getting back to the bookkeeper 
to inquire about the data reported. Less of this 
trouble, at last. Both effects altered account-
ability—however, in different ways. In a Strather-
nian/Harawaynian twist, we could voice: it matters 
what troubles trouble troubles.
I understand the information reportable in 
comments as a partial account of the modality of 
the numbers and units reported in a form. Such 
modality was co-constitutive of the numbers. 
Bookkeepers were responsible for the data 
they entered. For the bookkeeper, deleting the 
comment also implied that they alone carried 
the possibility for responding to questions on 
data. Providing a comment extended respon-
sibility materially to the database. The data set 
could respond directly to questions. A response-
able data set was also a risk, however, because 
it could answer to questions without the book-
keepers’ control. Deleting a comment made the 
data less accountable and reciprocally reduced 
the risk of having taken the work situation out 
of the worker’s control. No risk that the data set 
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would speak against the bookkeeper, no risk that 
the comment would raise undesired concerns or 
questions about the number’s straightforward 
story.
This shows that offering the comment quali-
tatively enriched ontologising the commented 
data and the reality of flight distance; and second, 
that opening up the ontological shape of what 
the data supposedly represents emerges as a risk. 
Without comment, ontologising for actors (other 
than Nick) was much more speculative—defini-
tively differently grounded, if not less grounded—
for they only encountered a straightforward 
fact, no detour via uniquely authored metadata, 
con-text. No signifier of trouble.
This seemingly straightforward fact was 
enrolable with less friction in a range of ontolo-
gies. Precisely because the numbers were not 
accompanied by explicit stories, the numbers lost 
their ability to resist arbitrary stories that would 
refer to the fact. Whilst the straightforward fact 
appears intuitively more certain, it emerges in my 
analysis as rather indeterminising.
Verran’s instrument of ontologising and 
attending to ontological practice helps fore-
grounding the range of potential stories about 
what is the case, the range of storying reality, 
how troubles trouble. This analysis in terms of 
ontologising troubles indexes a complicated 
space of responsibilities and accountabilities. I 
propose that Nick’s data submission mattered in 
two key ways. (1) Nick seemed to care for giving a 
good (enough) account of the flights. For that he 
edited the data after having received the spread-
sheet that had included, in his reading, non-flight 
costs, indexing his data sources ‘better’, cleaning 
up data. This qualification work involved onto-
logical considerations by Nick about what was 
not to count as short-haul flight costs, such as 
lunch costs. However, his explicit ontologising did 
not range into reasoning how domestic flights 
mapped onto the company’s definition of short-
haul flights. Thus, his routine calculation approach 
to translating domestic into short-haul flights 
remained stable. Ontics does not determine 
ontology. (2) Further, he wanted to complete 
the data submission without problems—and 
his boss had troubled the friction caused by 
qualifying data as estimated. Correspondingly, 
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deleting modalities became a solution. These two 
ways were not overly coherently aligned to one 
another. None of the actants involved dominated 
the relations around the data submission with 
a singular strategy. Much rather, this work space 
needs to be understood as ordering in multiple 
ways—situated doings that were both materi-
ally-semiotically ordered and in which actants 
enacted a non-deterministic order of the flight 
fact. Precisely because the comment got deleted 
the resulting data was interpretable in more ways.
The matter of the reported total short-haul 
flight distance of Nick’s subsidiary, thus, was not 
precise and stable. By way of staging the flight 
fact as simple, his ‘simple’ practice effected flight-
matter with less stable meanings and as a less 
fixed reference point compared to to upholding 
his indexing comment. Indeterminacy multiplies. 
The simplicity allowed more readings of and, 
thus, workings with the numbers. Removing the 
grounding of ontologies multiplies the space of 
narrative possibilities. Thus, the configuration 
of bookkeepers, the central database and head-
quarter staff achieved a world of flight matter 
that was loose, connectable to all kinds of other 
entities, and not explicitly referring to the multiple 
material-semiotic doings in which practices and 
entities were ordered and performing order.
I turn now to analysing this narration of the 
ontological significance of providing and deleting 
the comment as well as of cleaning up data. It has 
deployed a Verranian attention to actors (re)doing 
and not-doing ontology, generating a space of 
multiple stories of how the comment-in-relation 
mattered. This instrument of re- and alter-ontolo-
gising foregrounds relations and configurations of 
accountabilities, certainties and indeterminacies.
Deploying Verran’s ontology in this way 
performs ontologising ethnomethodologically. 
Using ontology involves a form of accounting. 
And these accounts can come with a range of 
temporal orientations. An ontological enactment 
may attempt to prefigure some practices; and in 
the very moment of ontic practice (e.g. Nick doing 
flight data, first-time-reading the spreadsheet), 
ontological reflection about these practices may 
take place (lunches are not flights); and doing 
ontology may as well relate back in time to offer 
a retrospective retelling about reality that, of 
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course, joins in shaping the present. With respect 
to versions of the past, I am reminded of the retro-
spective telling of plans, that always differs from 
situated actions, simultaneously offering a new 
account of reality-making joining in semiotic 
reconfigurations (Suchman, 2007). The realness 
effected in some material-semiotic practice may 
be reconfigured in material change and semiotic 
shifts over time—as in when a number sign that 
was accomplished to signify a specific reality is 
read differently, through another ontology. The 
ability for retrospective retelling and rereading 
allows the Verranian instrument of ontologising to 
account for members’ storying of realness where 
members’ own stories may gloss over, sidetrack 
from or even highlight relations between signs—
such as categories, units, number words and 
rules—or logics of how these should relate. 
Ontologies of reality multiply because it is not 
an antecedent reality that determines how the 
reality is theorised, but ontologies are enacted in 
time-places, and tomorrow’s ontology might be 
as different from the current as the ontology of a 
differently positioned actant in the present.
Following this consideration of troubles and 
multiplicity, I suggest that we can consider the 
use of this analytics as yielding several political 
troubles: in this analysis of narrating a number-
as-network, I opened up the politics of undoing 
modalities of claims and the trickiness of what 
it means to get the job done. Contrasting the 
troubles with the punctualising (Law, 1992) char-
acteristics of technologies of, say, policy recom-
mendation bullet points for evidence-based 
governance, Verran’s analytics is generative of 
stories of so rich realness that explodes punctu-
alisation attempts, rendering her analytics rather 
compatible with anti-hierarchical politics, such 
as workplace resistance in the midst of global 
environmental accounting. Spelling out an ever-
dynamic partial and situated realness-in-the-
making is unlikely to travel well in the universe of 
evidence discourse—hegemonic policy circles.
My Verranian-inflected account of a number’s 
metadata contrasts with the ease in which Nick’s 
numbers could circulate within the company 
and plug into the multinational’s global carbon 
accounting. Deleting the comment altered qual-
culability not in degrees but in kind, rendering 
the carbon accounting machinery more smooth, 
removing merely a tiny obstacle to it running well. 
This Western Asian subsidiary’s short-haul flight 
distance number became part of not-so-earthly 
machines of references in emission trading. Nick’s 
practice did not only effect collateral realness, 
but collateral certainty, too. Above we had iden-
tified that Nick was positioned to be certain that 
his slippery commensuration of domestic flights 
with short-haul flights would be organisationally 
appreciated. By attending to the space of storying 
around the comment the Verranian analytics fore-
grounds how certainty that the reported fact is 
straightforward is conjured up.
The corporation, too, was positioned through 
the enactment of the total short-haul flight 
distance to be certain that these short-haul 
flights existed. Whilst conjuring up out of costs 
a quantity for short-haul flights, these flights are 
enacted along the way as much as the certainty 
that they exist at least in so far that they do not 
resist their enactment. And deleting the comment 
helped reduce resistance. For the user, whether 
in the corporation’s HQ, its civil society or regula-
tory counterparts, the situation appears straight-
forward: “I read short-haul flights, I include them 
in my assessment, therefore I can be certain they 
exist.” Certainly, we are encountering here the 
multiplicity of certainty.
Conclusion
Narrating a number opens up possibilities for 
analysis that reveals worlds in the process of being 
made. This paper presented ‘narrating a number’ 
as a method of empirical philosophy. Narrating a 
number is generative of a narration that includes 
description and inferences. Here, the descrip-
tion is ethnographically derived. Description and 
inferences together ontologise the number. This 
method allows investigating the number-as-net-
work. Narrating a number, then, shows what is 
inside the number, what it is made up of, how it 
coheres and relates.
This paper conducted a two-fold exercise. 
First, it narrated and analytically renarrated a 
number, and its constituting calculative practices, 
explicating worlds being made—the case here 
shaping the world presumed in environmental 
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economics—emissions. Assembling emissions 
secures the demand basic to carbon markets. 
Second, it analysed how two analytical approaches 
within the field of actor-network theory—Verran’s 
(2001) take on ontology and Callon and Law’s 
(2005) three-stage process of qualculation—differ, 
complement or work against each other.
With their shared commitment to reality 
emerging in material-semiotic relating, both 
analytics are well positioned to agree with, or 
complement, each other. Comparing them 
indicates three sets of results.
First, as analysing numbers and calculations is 
discursively positioned in relation to competing 
formalist discourse, such as mathematics, it is 
relevant to note that both qualculation as much 
as Verran’s empirical ontology allow for inconsist-
ency to be part of numbering and calculating. 
While in qualculation analytics inconsistency 
may be encountered, its mattering is second to 
the achievement of (non)qualculability and their 
respective securing of a result or the impossi-
bility to draw out results. Verranian ontologising 
turns to how reals emerge, encourages attention 
to elements and practices, independently of 
how coherent they appear, and this may result 
in attending to entities and relations which the 
qualculation take does not need to generate a 
neat qualculation narration. Thus, whilst I find 
the commitment to material-semiotic relating 
shaping objects and worlds to be shared by both 
analytical approaches, what the approaches invite 
attention to is not equivalent.
Second, what these analytics foreground, 
is methodologically differently configured. In 
narrating a qualculation, I find myself positioned 
to reconstruct a quite linear temporality, prefig-
ured by this analytics’ three-stage process. Verran’s 
ontologising invites narrating of ongoing relating. 
The latter can be quite disorienting, but also gener-
ative in turning to practices’ multiple relations of 
accountability, backwards, forwards and sideways 
in time. The (non)qualculability attention appears 
as a focussing apparatus, singularising concern: 
which of either form of qualculability is achieved? 
Verranian ontologising, in contrast, appears as 
an instrument that guides puzzling, exploring 
troubling, maybe well described with Haraway’s 
(2016) quest to ‘stay with the trouble’.
This leads to the third point: While narrating a 
number through the qualculation analytics, I am 
repeatedly provoked (as some of the reviewers, 
too) to feel consternated: x = y, this can’t be! 
This approach seems to invite a form of external 
critique, In contrast, in ontologising troubles, I 
identify a form of infracritique, attending to collec-
tive accomplishment, multispecies co-authoring 
and wonder. Verran might call this exploring 
disconcertment.
I conclude that these two analytics offer useful 
instruments, and that both of the analytics’ instru-
ments are not equivalent in that they do not fore-
ground and guide attention equivalently. Thus, 
declaring the use of the ANT toolbox to open up 
numbers is not sufficiently specific, for it matters 
with which commitments the scholars prepares 
and analyses the material.
Venturing into prescriptive number analytics 
methodology, I suggest as criteria for narrating 
number: The narration needs to take a form such 
that a number’s worlding, relating, ontic and onto-
logical commitments can be analysed, as much 
as the frictions, gaps or disconnects between 
material, epistemic or logical entities or relations 
as well as the directedness of calculative processes 
or their meandering and swaying in social-mate-
rial space.
Along this narrative analysis, a final point 
crystallises—on numbers. Narrating a number 
explodes the number, for the number’s inside is 
relating in multiple ways to outsides. The inside/
outside dichotomy starts to collapse. Instead 
of presuming where the boundary of a number 
is, it seems now apt to analyse the boundary-
making of how numbers are made to, or seek to, 
be different to non-numberly space. We can also 
follow how numbers are enacted, singled out, or 
qualculative relations. Maybe provoked by qualcu-
lation’s thesis that quantification and judgement 
are interwoven, and sensitised by Verranian 
attending to ongoing relations by heterogeneous 
co-participants, number is denaturalised as much 
as pushed to the analytic margin: relations of 
qualifying need as much as attention as relations 
of quantifying. Yet, even more focus needs to be 
redirected to the multiple relations of connecting 
and disconnecting, relations of account-abili-
ties and response-abilities in networks that are 
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glossed with a shorthand as ‘number’. Such redi-
rection of concern in numbers studies might be 
called ‘after numbers’, for here we study what is 
within the number-as-network as much as, in a 
different topology, behind number signs.
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Notes
1  Asdal’s (2008) work, too, is relevant for ANT takes to open up numbers. However, in this paper, I want to 
focus on ethnographic, rather than historiographic, approaches.
2  The narration that I pursue here is not shaped to reconstruct a case of carbon management accounting. 
I do present such a case, explore it in the political and economic context, including relationships to 
stakeholders and standardisers—e.g., GRI reporting demands, the WBCSD, a global nature conservation 
NGO—elsewhere (see Lippert 2013, 2015, 2016).
3  Detailed methodological outlines of the study and its generalisations are available (Lippert 2014).
4  On the relations between the concepts of carbon, CO2 , and CO2e, see Lippert (2012).
5  The conversion factors differ because in short-haul flights the emissions resulting from take-off and 
airport infrastructure relative to the emissions by a plane flying in ‘parallel’ to earth’s surface is larger 
than in long-haul flights (326g versus 180g per kilometre) (see Lippert 2013: 101).
6  Cochoy introduced the notion in 2002, see Cochoy (2008).
7  Gorur’s (2018) contribution to this issue further nuances and enriches Callon and Law’s (2005) take on 
non-qualculability.
8  Economists refer to this move as externalisation. More specifically, however, I identify a form of internal 
externality: the project of internalising environmental consumption facts folds into itself the externalisa-
tion of the statuses of these particular environments (cf. Strathern 2005).
9  On plug-ins, see Latour (2005).
10  For a more elaborate re-reading and contextualisation of Verran’s work, consider Kenney’s (2015) contri-
bution.
11  See Verran 1999: n.16; 2001: 116–118; 2005: 42; 2007a: 36.
12  See Verran 1999: n.16; 2001: 118; 2005: 42; 2007a: 34; 2009: 5, 17; Verran and Christie 2007.
